an amazing conversation

I just did a quick keyword search in USCAN to see how many books on globalization were available in the USC library system and was struck by the recency of texts: out of 500 titles listed, 200 titles were published in the past year (2004) and almost 50 titles have 2005 publication dates. It seems significant to me to note that so many people are all so invested in this debate!

the real war by thomas freidman

Friedman, T. (2001). The real war. In Moser & Watters (Eds.)
Creating America 4th ed. (pp. 519-521). NJ: Pearson / Prentice Hall.

Friedman, T. (2001). The real war. The New York Times, 27 Nov. 2001, A19.
Retrieved Mar. 24, 2005, from Expanded Academic ASAP database.

Some background on Friedman: Thomas L. Friedman is a journalist with the NY Times and a three-time winner of the Pulitzer Prize. He received a Master of Philosophy degree from Oxford University in Modern Middle Eastern Studies in 1978; from 1979-1984, he reported for the Times from Beirut, Lebanon, and from 1984-1988, he reported from Jerusalem where he served as the Times' Israel Bureau Chief. He is Jewish. His most notable longer work is The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000).

Summary: According to Friedman in The Real War (2001), the United States is fighting in Iraq to "defeat an ideology: religious totalitarianism" for which "terrorism is just a tool" (p. 519). He compares this war to our prior struggles against "secular totalitarianism" during the Cold War when the U.S. fought against Communism and Nazism. Because this new struggle involves religion, Friedman argues that the war must be conducted in religious leaders in "schools, mosques, churches, and synagogues" as well as by armies. In particular, Friedman argues for an "ideology of plurality" that accepted "multiple" truths which are held by "all faiths that come out of the biblical tradition" (as suggested by Rabbi Hartman quoted in Friedman, p. 520). Friedman asserts that advocates of both Jewish and Christian faiths have been able to "reinterpret" sacred texts to accommodate modern perspectives such as a "multilingual view of God"; however, he also asserts that Moslems have not yet been able to make this significant shift to recognize the validity of other faith systems. He concludes with an appeal to "mainstream Moslems" to "realize" that they too must "interpret their past" so as to live peacefully in "this integrated, globalized world" (p. 521).

Pattern of organization: The op-ed genre is a specialized form of argument; see CCL, "The Genres of Public Debate," in Chapter 5, pp. 180-182. Editorials and op-ed's typically generate letters to the editor in reaction to an author's strongly stated opinions. Friedman is relying on an ethos that he has cultivated over his professional career to make his case as well as relying on authorities such as Rabbi Hartman. This is an example of an argument based primarily on ethos or authority.

For further analysis: Find letters to the editor that responded to Friedman's op-ed by doing a dated search; use the date of Nov. 27, 2001 as your starting point to see if you can find out how readers reacted to this particular column.

samuel huntington

Huntington, S. (1993). The clash of civilizations? In Watters (Ed.)
Global Exchange (pp. 226-251). NJ: Pearson / Prentice Hall.

Huntington clearly states his thesis: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict…will be cultural" (p. 226). He calls the conflicts of the past "century and a half" (initiated with the Peace of Westphalia and ending with the secession of the Cold War) the "Western phase" of international politics: currently, the "centerpiece" of politics has become the relationship between the non-West and the West (p. 227). Huntington defines civilization as "cultural entity" (p. 227) which describes a collection of communities and countries: for instance, Europe shares a culture the West while China shares cultural norms with Japan and other Asian / Oriental countries. Huntington describes his analysis as "descriptive" (p. 248) so as to "consider implications" for peaceful co-existence during a period of time when distinctively different civilizations and values must share a common earth.

Huntington notes that historians such as Toynbee assert that there are currently six contemporary cultures (p. 228). These distinctive cultures are politically at odds. Huntington explains six reasons why modern warfare will be based on differences between civilizations (as opposed to difference between nation / states).
· First, basic differences between cultures such as Western, Islamic, Hindu, and Latin American cultures have historically "generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts" in world history (p. 229).
· Secondly, immigration and modern technologies have pushed different civilizations with different values together which has fostered deep-seated animosities (p. 229).
· Third, economic modernization has "weaken[ed] the nation state; just as Barber has noted, nations are less powerful than corporations. In turn, fundamentalists have increasingly begun to resist the secularizing tendencies of McWorld (p. 230).
· Fourth, the "elites" of most non-west civilizations are now proponents of indigenous resurgences (p. 230).
· Fifth, ideologies have become more significant than nationalism, and ethnic identities have become politicized. As Huntington notes, "A person can be half French and half Arab… [but] it is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim" (p. 230).
· Sixth, countries that share belief systems have begun to form economic blocks (p. 231) which along with regionalism and ethnic identification, tends to create an "us" versus "them" relation (p. 232).

In Huntington's examination of the "fault lines" that have begun to appear in the New World order, he asserts that the tensions (and potential earthquakes) created along these lines "occur at two levels": at the "micro-level, adjacent groups…struggle, often violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power…[and] struggle for control of international institutions and third parties" (p. 232). In particular, Huntington examines the re-emergence of the historical divisions between major religions: Western Christians, Orthodox Christians, and Moslems, along the fault line which he draws between the ancient "Hapsburg and Ottoman empires" (p. 233).

Huntington characterizes peoples to the "north and west" of this fault line as peoples who descend from Europeans, the beneficiaries of the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution, and who are thus "economically better off" (p. 233). In contrast, Huntington characterizes peoples to the "east and south" of this fault line as beneficiaries of the "Ottoman or Tsarist empires," who are "much less likely to develop stable democratic systems" because they have historically been ruled by dictators and tyrants, even in more recent times since the Iron Curtain has given way to the Velvet Curtain. Huntington briefly outlines a broad sweep of historical events during the past 1300 years, to examine the waxing and waning tensions along this historic fault line, outlining the major wars of Europe and the Middle East to conclude that Desert Storm (in 1990) is the most recent (in 1993) illustration of the "centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam," which Huntington asserts is "unlikely to decline" and which he predicts "could become more virulent" (p. 234). In some areas along this particular fault line (Iran and Iraq), anti-Western forces have become increasingly stronger; additionally, immigration of Muslims has led to racism particularly in Europe (p. 235). Huntington quotes Akbar, to predict that "the next confrontation … is definitely going to come from the Muslim world" (p. 235).

A second fault line can also be found between "Arab Islamic civilization" and Africa. Huntington again briefly outlines a broad sweep of historical conflicts to illustrate "the probability" of continuing struggles between Muslims and Hindus and between Muslims and north African Christians. In short, "Islam has bloody borders" (p. 237).

Next, Huntington examines the predictable reactions of nation / states to these historic conflicts by asserting that Greenway's description of "kin-country syndrome" can be examined as an explanation for emergence of new coalitions. Huntington further explains that in a "world of clashing civilizations," people will inevitably use a "double-standard" when cooperating with "kin-countries" (p. 238). Again, Huntington briefly illustrates his assertions by examining a broad sweep of historical wars and struggles to conclude that "the next war…will be a war between civilizations" (p. 240). This is a dire prediction indeed, and it's difficult to argue against Huntington's predictions even when we note that Huntington asserted in 1993 that there has been "virtually no violence between Russians and Ukrainians" (p. 240), an assertion which we know a decade later is absolutely false.

Huntington turns in his analysis to examine the dominant role of the West in the UN and other international institutions to assert that the West has increasingly attempted to "run the world in ways that will maintain Western interests…, political and economic values" (p. 241). Huntington characterizes Western values as "individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, [and] the separation of church and state" (p. 242). However, these values which are "most important" to Westerners are "least important worldwide" (according to Triandis, as footnoted in Huntington). Huntington describes three kinds of "responses" by the "non-West" to the West: 1. isolation (i.e. North Korea); 2. "bandwagoning" or "attempting to join the West and accept its values and institutions"; and 3. "balanc[ing]" by adopting some modern ways while denying Western norms (pp. 242-243).

Finally, Huntington examines the "torn countries" that he describes have been created by "bandwagoning" and "balancing": in particular, he points to Turkey, Mexico, and Russia as prototypes of "torn countries." Huntington asserts that "a torn country must meet three requirements": 1. the "political and economic elite" have to support any movements towards Westernization; 2. the general public has to accept these movements; and 3. all of the other countries within the "kinship area" have to "embrace the convert" (p. 245). Huntington believes that Latin American and East European countries will have little trouble with joining with the West, while Russian, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist countries will have more difficulty (with the notable exemption of Japan). Huntington turns his attention to Western relationships with "weapon states" (p. 246) to explain that arms control, particularly regarding nuclear weapons, has become increasingly significant, especially since China has become a "major exporter of arms and weapons technology" as a "Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into being" (p. 247). Ultimately, Huntington asserts that his "descriptive hypotheses" lead to "implications" for "short-term advantage and long-term accommodation" (p. 248). Most importantly, Huntington asserts that "the West" must "develop a more profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations see their interests" (p. 249).

affluenza

Today, as I got dressed, I took note of the countries where my clothes had been made: my sweater comes from China, my blouse from Vietnam, my skirt from Hong Kong. My other articles of clothing come from Mexico and Guatamala. The towels that I used originated in India and Pakistan.

In class, I showed students all of the printed ad materials that showed up along with my Sunday paper: Easter sales for all kinds of clothing, shoes, candies, and other consumer items entice us to buy, buy, buy. Credit cards make overspending so easy... until the bills come.

I encourage you to investigate further... check out the web site listed above. (For those in the 11:00 class, you got to see part of the video; those of you in the 10:00 class will view a selection of the video in class on Wednesday, now that the overhead light switch has been fixed. By the way, the technician who fixed the light switch acknowledged that these switches aren't "worth a dime; they break all the time." Another feature of our throw away society.

Post some comments to your blogs.

benjamin barber

Barber, B. R. (1992). Jihad vs. McWorld. In Berndt & Muse (Eds.)
Composing a civic life (pp. 370-380). NY: Pearson / Longman.

Summary: According to Barber in Jihad vs. McWorld (1992), we face "two possible political futures - both bleak, neither democratic... [either] a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of …social cooperation and civic mutuality, [or] one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce" (p. 370). Barber asserts that "the forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions" so as to create a "centrifugal whirlwind" that competes with a "centripetal black hole" (pp. 370-371). Neither outcome is desirable.

Pattern of organization: Contrast and comparison in support of problem / solution

After setting up the opposing forces of McWorld and Jihad, Barber begins with the force with which most of us are most familiar; he first develops the forces of McWorld by exploring "four imperatives" (p. 371).

Barber asserts that McWorld has "eroded" national boundaries because "all national markets" have become "vulnerable" to free trade and international banking / currency exchanges that allow and privilege transnational and multinational corporations and entities like the World Bank. On the surface, peace is fostered by open markets. Religious and racial markers become less important when the more important characteristic of being human is seen as being able to shop and consume.

Furthermore, no one country can sustain itself as an ""autarky" anymore; we are all interdependent. Even wealthy countries like the United States depend on resources (like oil) found in other areas of the world (p. 372). The flow of goods is paralleled by the flow of ideas across boundaries because of modern developments in science and technology, particularly in the integration of "computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-optic, and microchip technologies" that have given us access to information and people all of the time in all places (p. 373).

Like James Watson, Barber acknowledges that the concepts associated with multinationals such as McDonalds, Disney, and Coke are more powerful than military force: "What is the power of the Pentagon compared with Disneyland? Can the Sixth Fleet keep up with CNN? McDonalds in Moscow and Coke in China will do more… than military colonization ever could" (p. 373).

Barber warns us, however, that capitalism and democracy "have a relationship, but it is something less than a marriage" (p. 374). Particularly in ecological and environmental matters, capitalism has created "greater inequality" because the modern world can not afford to allow developing countries to consume natural resources at the increasingly devastating rate that we see occurring in the current consumer markets.

Turning to the forces of Jihad, Barber relies on analysis of political headlines. Barber expects that his readers (of the Atlantic Monthly) will be quite familiar with the litany of political events mentioned in his discussion; for instance, he employs Lebanon metaphorically to examine literally hundreds of "subnational factions in permanent rebellion" (p. 374). He asserts that Jihad (which literally translates as "struggle") typically implies religious and parochial zealots who are "angry… proselytizing, deistic, ethnocentric" (and note that this article appeared in 1992, just after the first Gulf War, and just before the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; note also that Barber makes reference to Saddam Hussein's "fatal mistake" of having invaded Kuwait when he asserts that "[d]espots who slaughter their own populations are no problem, so long as they leave markets in place and refrain from making wars on their neighbors" (p. 376). Barber draws parallels to the "Eastern European revolutions" (after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989) and to "Havel's velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia" (p. 377) to assert that democracies in these new nations can be very tentative and can easily be "traded away" by "anxious…new rulers" who seek to create solidarity; "the result has often been anarchy, repression, persecution, and the [return] of very old kinds of despotism" (p. 377).

Ultimately, ironically, McWorld and Jihad share dangerous characteristics: both are "antipolitical" and "antidemocratic" (p. 377). Barber proposes a "Confederal option" to counter both the "indifference" of McWorld and the "antithetical" tendencies of Jihad; although, he admits briefly that McWorld will probably prevail; "Jihad may be a last deep sigh before the eternal yawn of McWorld" (p. 378). Barber acknowledges that "confederations" modeled after the American Articles of Confederation that "stitched together" the American colonies after the American Revolution might be a preferred model to foster "decentralized participatory democracy" (p. 378). Barber thus urges those who wish to build democracies to "see out indigenous democratic impulses" and to be patient with the slow development of democracies that have to develop locally. Barber suggests that the "tortoise" of slow development is more likely to "win" the race than the "hares" who attempt to impose democracy all at once (p. 379); Barber thus concludes by quoting Rousseau, who wrote, "Freedom… is a food easy to eat but hard to digest" (p. 380).

Further analysis: In this particular case, the Internet is probably the better source for additional info on Barber: see http://www.benjaminrbarber.com/

Barber has most recently published another analysis entitled Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (2003) in which he examines US foreign relations since 2001. The themes of the newer text are similar to his assertions in his earlier work, however: "You can't export McWorld and call it democracy" and "You can't export America and call it freedom" (USCAn). Available through inter-library loan.

watson and mcdonalds

Watson, J. L. (2000, May/June). China’s Big Mac attack. In Berndt & Muse (Eds.)
Composing a civic life (pp. 359-370). NY: Pearson / Longman.

Summary: According to Watson in China's Big Mac Attack (2000), fast food restaurants have made significant inroads in Chinese culture; therefore, he asks the question: "Is globalism - and its cultural variant, McDonaldization - the face of the future?" (p. 360) - an important question as we initiate our study of western influences on the rest of the world. Watson answers his own rhetorical question by

Pattern of organization: Cause and effect (and a hint of problem / solution)

First Watson claims to review the literature and the theorists who "argue that transnational corporations like McDonald's provide the shock troops for a new form of imperialism that is far more successful, and therefore more insidious, than its militaristic antecedents" (p. 360). But instead of academicians, he highlights op-ed writers such as Ronald Steel and Thomas Friedman, who has noted that no countries with McDonald's have ever fought each other in a war (p. 361).

To further investigate the secrets of the successful inroads made by fast food industries, Watson next explores the history of McDonald's in Hong Kong (a British consulate where McDonald's was "promoted… as an outpost of American culture" (p. 361). Because of changes in family life and traditional family values in China, Watson notes that McDonalds has taken advantage of an emerging focus on the "needs and aspirations" of the modern Chinese family, particularly given the "lavish attention" being given to the single child, the "little emperors and empresses" who are particularly vulnerable to the entertainments of "Uncle McDonald" (p. 363).

Admittedly, there are resisters who "grimace"; Watson points out that McDonald's has become a target for public protests against America, which has increased the "symbolic load" carried by the golden arches (p. 365).

However, McDonald's has responded by "disciplining" its work force and its customer base, and in so doing, has appealed to an "elite" group emerging within the modernized, consumer-based cultures that are developing in markets around the world. McDonalds has cleverly embedded itself into the local cultures in such a way that "it is increasingly difficult to see where the transnational ends and the local begins" (p. 369).

Further analysis: Watch for the war images and metaphors: "shock troops" and "outpost" indicate that Watson believes that international corporations have an imperialist design; they hope to conquer new territories and occupy new markets.

Note too that this essay is the intro to a collection of analyses on the inroads of fast foods in the Asian market: see USCan for further info / authors who have contributed to this collection edited and introduced by James Watson.

Barber, B. R. (1992). Jihad vs. McWorld. In Berndt & Muse (Eds.)
Composing a civic life (pp. 370-380). NY: Pearson / Longman.

Summary: According to Barber in Jihad vs. McWorld (1992), we face "two possible political futures - both bleak, neither democratic... [either] a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of …social cooperation and civic mutuality, [or] one commercially homogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce" (p. 370). Barber asserts that "the forces of Jihad and the forces of McWorld operate with equal strength in opposite directions" so as to create a "centrifugal whirlwind" that competes with a "centripetal black hole" (pp. 370-371). Neither outcome is desirable.

Pattern of organization: Contrast and comparison in support of problem / solution

After setting up the opposing forces of McWorld and Jihad, Barber begins with the force with which most of us are most familiar; he first develops the forces of McWorld by exploring "four imperatives" (p. 371).

Barber asserts that McWorld has "eroded" national boundaries because "all national markets" have become "vulnerable" to free trade and international banking / currency exchanges that allow and privilege transnational and multinational corporations and entities like the World Bank. On the surface, peace is fostered by open markets. Religious and racial markers become less important when the more important characteristic of being human is seen as being able to shop and consume.

Furthermore, no one country can sustain itself as an ""autarky" anymore; we are all interdependent. Even wealthy countries like the United States depend on resources (like oil) found in other areas of the world (p. 372). The flow of goods is paralleled by the flow of ideas across boundaries because of modern developments in science and technology, particularly in the integration of "computer, television, cable, satellite, laser, fiber-optic, and microchip technologies" that have given us access to information and people all of the time in all places (p. 373).

Like James Watson, Barber acknowledges that the concepts associated with multinationals such as McDonalds, Disney, and Coke are more powerful than military force: "What is the power of the Pentagon compared with Disneyland? Can the Sixth Fleet keep up with CNN? McDonalds in Moscow and Coke in China will do more… than military colonization ever could" (p. 373).

Barber warns us, however, that capitalism and democracy "have a relationship, but it is something less than a marriage" (p. 374). Particularly in ecological and environmental matters, capitalism has created "greater inequality" because the modern world can not afford to allow developing countries to consume natural resources at the increasingly devastating rate that we see occurring in the current consumer markets.

Turning to the forces of Jihad, Barber relies on analysis of political headlines. Barber expects that his readers (of the Atlantic Monthly) will be quite familiar with the litany of political events mentioned in his discussion; for instance, he employs Lebanon metaphorically to examine literally hundreds of "subnational factions in permanent rebellion" (p. 374). He asserts that Jihad (which literally translates as "struggle") typically implies religious and parochial zealots who are "angry… proselytizing, deistic, ethnocentric" (and note that this article appeared in 1992, just after the first Gulf War, and just before the first bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; note also that Barber makes reference to Saddam Hussein's "fatal mistake" of having invaded Kuwait when he asserts that "[d]espots who slaughter their own populations are no problem, so long as they leave markets in place and refrain from making wars on their neighbors" (p. 376). Barber draws parallels to the "Eastern European revolutions" (after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989) and to "Havel's velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia" (p. 377) to assert that democracies in these new nations can be very tentative and can easily be "traded away" by "anxious…new rulers" who seek to create solidarity; "the result has often been anarchy, repression, persecution, and the [return] of very old kinds of despotism" (p. 377).

Ultimately, ironically, McWorld and Jihad share dangerous characteristics: both are "antipolitical" and "antidemocratic" (p. 377). Barber proposes a "Confederal option" to counter both the "indifference" of McWorld and the "antithetical" tendencies of Jihad; although, he admits briefly that McWorld will probably prevail; "Jihad may be a last deep sigh before the eternal yawn of McWorld" (p. 378). Barber acknowledges that "confederations" modeled after the American Articles of Confederation that "stitched together" the American colonies after the American Revolution might be a preferred model to foster "decentralized participatory democracy" (p. 378). Barber thus urges those who wish to build democracies to "see out indigenous democratic impulses" and to be patient with the slow development of democracies that have to develop locally. Barber suggests that the "tortoise" of slow development is more likely to "win" the race than the "hares" who attempt to impose democracy all at once (p. 379); Barber thus concludes by quoting Rousseau, who wrote, "Freedom… is a food easy to eat but hard to digest" (p. 380).

Further analysis: In this particular case, the Internet is probably the better source for additional info on Barber: see http://www.benjaminrbarber.com/

Barber has most recently published another analysis entitled Fear's empire: war, terrorism, and democracy (2003) in which he examines US foreign relations since 2001. The themes of the newer text are similar to his assertions in his earlier work, however: "You can't export McWorld and call it democracy" and "You can't export America and call it freedom" (USCAn). Available through inter-library loan.

defining global citizenship

As we saw in class, we can think of ourselves as global citizens or as global consumers, and depending on our different perspectives, we are either concerned about issues such as education and the sustainability of our environment, or about how much we can buy, easily and cheaply. In many ways, being a global citizen involves completely opposite values from being a global consumer. A global consumer won't really care much about where a product is made as long as she can buy it at an affordable price. A global citizen will stop and ask if a child in a sweatshop had to work for ungodly hours in inhumane conditions just so that the product was made available through imports so that it would be available for wealthy people a world away.

I find myself questioning how much I can really know about cultures in other parts of the world especially when I read selections like Thiong'o on page 353 in CCL: "I was born into a large peasant family [with a] father, four wives and about twenty-eight children...." and yet I can identify with the same author's statement: "English became the measure of intelligence and ability" (p. 355), which allows a child to "progress" - and the language of English has become an important western import to the developing world.

I recently read that South Koreans encourage their children to watch western TV so that they will learn more English. When Watson (pp. 359+) questions why Chinese parents would encourage their children to eat in McDonald's, and quotes Yan, a UCLA anthropologist who "discovered that working class Beijing residents save up to take their children to McDonald's" (p. 362) as a step of preparation towards Harvard or MIT, this is revealing of the change in attitudes that the Chinese now have towards their children, as "full scale consumers" (p. 364) not unlike American children.

The changing of cultural norms because of westerns expectations (impositions?) is further illustrated in Watson by discussion of "the line" which is first mandated by managers but later self-inforced by "regular customers" (p. 365); ironically, "public civility" is now associated with western norms in Asian cities like Beijing.

The cultural contrasts between fast food establishments in America and Beijing becomes more apparent, however, in Watson's discussion of how "consumers" in the Far East have turned the fast food restaurants into community centers where they can safely visit, read, or entertain.

Watson's analysis of McDonald's in China does digress into critique of the "little emperors / empresses" who he predicts will become so very selfish and indulged (after all, one child doted upon by four grandparents is a universal formula for disaster). Watson crosses over into economic predictions (the dismal science) when he writes that "like their counterparts in [AARP], future retirees in China are likely to be a vociferous, agressive lot who will demand more" consumer goods and benefits (p. 368).

As we have already seen in discussions of changing families and values in the U.S., globally, these changes are taking root in many parts of the world, so that these debates between being a consumer or a citizen take on global implications. Six billion people consuming at the same rate that Americans now consume would inevitably lead to environmental destruction and disputes would lead to wars over natural resources. As Watson acknowledges, the question is no longer simply "whose culture is it" that dominates; the more important question is what will be the outcome of "adventurism associated with rising affluence" (p. 365) as markets are opened and imports (and the Internet) make shopping a world-wide event?

defining family notes

Notes taken on Defining Families (notes on CCL chapter 7)

Getting started: Images which I have in connection with family include family photos consisting of husband and wife; or of father, mother, daughter, and son; grandparents with grandchildren – or sometimes of extended families such as reunions, weddings, Christmas dinners and the like. On my dresser, I keep pictures of myself with my husband taken on our 25th wedding anniversary, as well as a photo of our whole family taken (at Olin Mills’ of course) when our daughter and son were young, as well as other photographic shots: our daughter and son in law after their wedding, our son dressed for his senior prom. My family fits the traditional image of family.

The grouping in the Rolling Stone photo of a “new” American family strikes me as the type of less committed group that I associate with Hollywood and pop culture. The “show” of family seems to be less real than fantasy, staged, designed, imagined.

Advertisements and television contribute to both extremes: nuclear and traditional families are certainly portrayed (as I type this, the television runs a United Air ad showing a retired man who decides to take his wife on a trip, followed by a father who considers how he will send his children to college by investing with Merrill Lynch – hardly a non-traditional attitude, but the Oscars are also being featured with all of the Hollywood pairings and splits that movies seem to inspire).

Monday, February 21: Pipher’s text, “Beliefs About Family” is taken from The Shelter of Each Other: Rebuilding Our Families (1996, available through inter-library loan). To analyze Pipher’s text, I first note that her thesis is an expanded definition and thus she deals with an issue of substantiation; she seeks to define "family" and thus deals with an issue of "disputed facts, definitions, causes, and consequences": According to Pipher, “Family is a collection of people who pool resources and help each other over the long haul” (237). In our society, one is “very lucky” if one’s family, so defined, is the one that one “is born into”; instead, more often, one forms a “family” of sorts. Pipher notes, however, that the security of family is not easily recreated. Therefore, her argument is one of substance, of definition. She uses examples of young men who recall being so beaten by fathers that they were forced to leave home, or of young women abandoned by mothers, to advocate the Sioux definition of family as extended community, where all adults were responsible for all children, as the most “healthy” for a community.

The context for Pipher's debate has been an on-going discussion in America about whether families are "broken"; we have long argued over particular issues that are implicated by changing gender roles such as the consequences of women in the workforce, day care, aging parents and nursing care, single parenting, divorce, and other volatile issues. Value-laden stereotypes are involved. Typically, religious and conservative voices have called for more traditional roles to be maintained; more liberal and non-traditional voices urge for more acceptance of different viewpoints. Pipher's intended readers would lean towards the more conservative views.

Pipher's reputation at the time of this writing depended on her publication of Reviving Ophelia (1994); ironically, Laura Bush a decade later is focusing her attention on the same kinds of concerns regarding adolescent boys.

As evidence and backing, Pipher examines the destructive influences that break down families: from idealized versions on television, to dysfunctional versions, the “culture of narcissism” and the pressures of contemporary culture on adult children who “after a certain age, … no longer have permission to love their parents” in a type of “socialized antipathy” (239). As enabling assumptions, Pipher notes that many cultures do not encourage children to abandon families for mates; however, western norms and especially Americans do value independence, to an extreme (240).

Pipher claims that we have now reached the “limits” of pushing individual rights to the point that “the rules of civility” are “crumbling”; “rudeness is everywhere” (240). Pipher ends by asserting that our culture has become so money-driven and so intent on the bottom line that “doing what is meaningful” as a family has become lost in the “commitment… to the self” and “doing what is reimbursed” (241).

In an Educational Leadership article (May 1998), Pipher adds to the discussion that we find on pp. 237+ by examining the impact that media portrayals have on our common expectations about family (which run to extremes of perfect to dysfunctional). Add notes here about this text???

I find myself remembering both my own “going away to college” and reflecting on my children’s experiences with separation from home; it’s never easy and perhaps it is harder on parents than on the children who leave. Parents are left “behind” while their children meet new friends and experience new ways of thinking. College students often do reach a point where they “prefer a community of friends to their biological families” (p. 238); but, as Pipher also acknowledges, “friends are harder to make in a world where people are busy, moving, and isolated” (p. 239. I recall having the luxury of spending time with new friends in the dorms, in college apartments, and during college activities; I often wonder what the experience of going to college would be like for my students who still live “at home” or who see college as just a matter of attending classes before going to work. I do agree that most American parents do hope that their children will be self-supporting and thus tend to encourage “leaving the nest” but I have also been fortunate both as a young adult who was supported by parents and as a parent who has been able to support my own children.

Wednesday, February 23: In this comparison of images, I’m actually more bothered by the depiction of the Scheibners (p. 245) because of the number of children: I deliberately had two children because I have strong beliefs about the fact that globally, our population needs to be held in check. The allusion to the “Onward Christian Soldiers” anthem of the crusades also begs analysis; the growing trend of home schooled students is of interest to me as an educator, especially since the evidence points undeniably towards the fact that home schooled students come to college better prepared for the rigors of academic study. Like Talbot, I question the extreme restrictions on these children, and I note the ironies of Talbot’s decisions not to explain why she and her husband have different last names or the implications of a growing cluster of advertisements for a Christian lifestyle.

Compositionally, Riedell’s photo centers the father in front of the big white house, surrounded by pretty children while his pleasant looking wife is pictured to the right; Seliger’s photo for Rolling Stone centers the mother (looking very natural with flowers in her hair) surrounded by other women and feminine allusions, while David Crosby as the lone male figure is situated to the right. It’s fairly obvious that in Riedell’s photo, the father is in control; whereas in Seliger’s photo, Melissa Etheridge has control of the set.

Both photos are promotional; the intention of the photographer is to entice the reader to examine the extremes of male / female dominations within family groups. (Ironically, even though I see my own family as much more traditional, most of my own family portraits are also female centered… humm.)

Note the statistics on www.childstat.gov; the number of children living with single parents is rising and the number of children living in poverty is also rising; anecdotally, I hear friends who are elementary teachers complaining more and more about children who are unable to learn. A friend who teaches third grade at a local elementary school told me yesterday that she's so tired of working with children who simply don't care to learn, because of parents who simply do not value education at all. She noted that these children don't even care to learn about their state (she's particularly interested in social studies and SC history) or the places that they might call home.

Anna Quindlen’s “The Good Enough Mother” contrasts the “new standards of mothering” with reflections on her own mother, who – according to Quindlen – might be seen as “neglectful” judged by today’s standards, but Quindlen’s point is that because “we live in a perfection society now,” no mother can measure up to “manic motherhood” as an “super-mom” who becomes a martyr. As Quindlen notes, “martyrs die” and it’s much more important to remember the fun times of family. Quindlen’s primary concept of her own mother was of a “safe place” which gave her freedom to roam, explore, and laugh.

Friday, February 25: In contrast to previous examinations of family (and most of these are really focused on mothers' roles - what about fathers?), James McBride’s mother, described in “Black Power” seemed to the young boy to be lacking in personal safety even though she was obviously in control: her refusal to answer his questions about her own background, however, and this son is bothered by a number of his mother’s denials: her “refusal to acknowledge her whiteness” (p. 262), her inability to give any quantity of time to any of the twelve children (two marriages are acknowledged on page 265), her insistence on “absolute privacy” and her distrust of all outsiders in general, her contradictory stances on issues such as welfare.

Monday, February 28: In conclusion, I’m struck by the extremes and the muddy middle; the mothers (and fathers?) who are idealized with all of their imagined picture perfect traits, and by all of the mothers and fathers who are actualized with all of their contradictions. In the end, we all have images of mothers and fathers and families who don’t quite get everything “right” even if we have a fixed image of what might even be called “right” – I recall again my own special father and his attempts to hold a family together after our mother’s tragically early death, as well as images of friends who had other problematic features in their families, and ultimately, I do agree that families serve to sustain and to support most of us throughout our lives.

The real “paradigm shift” that has occurred is that of moving away – physically – from the extended family of rural days; with children moving so much further away from mothers and fathers (perhaps exacerbated by divorce), and with fewer elderly parents staying in the homes of their children (fostered by an entire culture of assisted living arrangements), I believe that families are endangered. The cultural pressures on families are real; the environmental stresses are immense.

Every Sunday, I look over the pictures of young couples announcing engagements or recent marriages. Often, I’ve taught one or more of these young adults (and I especially look to see when they’ve graduated from USCA’s various degree programs and where they now have jobs). Most of them are about the same ages as my own adult children, so I sometimes know these young adults personally because of their prior involvements with my own family. I do think that it is possible to bring up the topic of family without polarizing debates about public policies, to cast family in terms of hope and compassion and support. I do think that a good place to examine families can be in analysis of the televised and advertised images in our culture, as well as to analyze current rhetorical debates (I heard President Bush this morning addressing the country's governors about the needs of families!).